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间谍战争:中情局如何秘密帮助乌克兰对抗普京

The Spy War: How the C.I.A. Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin

[2024年2月29日] 来源:NY Times  整理:Geilien.cn   字号 [] [] []  
ADAM ENTOUS, MICHAEL SCHWIRTZ
本月,一名乌克兰士兵在俄罗斯防线附近的森林里。在过去八年中,中情局支持的间谍基地网络已经建成,其中包括沿俄罗斯边境的12个秘密地点。
本月,一名乌克兰士兵在俄罗斯防线附近的森林里。在过去八年中,中情局支持的间谍基地网络已经建成,其中包括沿俄罗斯边境的12个秘密地点。 Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Nestled in a dense forest, the Ukrainian military base appears abandoned and destroyed, its command center a burned-out husk, a casualty of a Russian missile barrage early in the war.
茂密森林中的乌克兰军事基地似乎被遗弃和摧毁了,它的指挥中心已被烧成废墟,那是战争初期俄罗斯导弹袭击的结果。


But that is above ground.
但这只是地面上的情况。


Not far away, a discreet passageway descends to a subterranean bunker where teams of Ukrainian soldiers track Russian spy satellites and eavesdrop on conversations between Russian commanders. On one screen, a red line followed the route of an explosive drone threading through Russian air defenses from a point in central Ukraine to a target in the Russian city of Rostov.
不远处,一条隐蔽的通道通向一个地下掩体,乌克兰士兵在那里跟踪俄罗斯间谍卫星,窃听俄罗斯指挥官之间的对话。在一个屏幕上,一条红线显示了一架爆炸无人机穿过俄罗斯防空系统的路线,它从乌克兰中部的一个地点飞往俄罗斯城市罗斯托夫的一个目标。


The underground bunker, built to replace the destroyed command center in the months after Russia’s invasion, is a secret nerve center of Ukraine’s military.
这个地下掩体是乌克兰军方的秘密神经中枢,在俄罗斯入侵后的几个月里,它取代了被摧毁的指挥中心。


There is also one more secret: The base is almost fully financed, and partly equipped, by the C.I.A.
还有一个秘密:该基地几乎全部由中情局资助,部分装备也由中情局提供。


“One hundred and ten percent,” Gen. Serhii Dvoretskiy, a top intelligence commander, said in an interview at the base.
“百分之一百一,”最高情报指挥官谢尔盖·德沃雷茨基上将在基地接受采访时说。


Now entering the third year of a war that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, the intelligence partnership between Washington and Kyiv is a linchpin of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. The C.I.A. and other American intelligence agencies provide intelligence for targeted missile strikes, track Russian troop movements and help support spy networks.
这场夺去数十万人生命的战争如今已经进入第三个年头,华盛顿和基辅之间的情报伙伴关系是乌克兰自卫能力的关键。中央情报局和其他美国情报机构为针对性的导弹袭击提供情报,追踪俄罗斯军队的动向,并为间谍网络提供支援。


But the partnership is no wartime creation, nor is Ukraine the only beneficiary.
但这种伙伴关系不是在战争时期建立的,乌克兰也不是唯一的受益者。


It took root a decade ago, coming together in fits and starts under three very different U.S. presidents, pushed forward by key individuals who often took daring risks. It has transformed Ukraine, whose intelligence agencies were long seen as thoroughly compromised by Russia, into one of Washington’s most important intelligence partners against the Kremlin today.
它在十年前生根发芽,在三位风格迥异的美国总统领导下,由那些经常敢于冒险的关键人物所推动,时断时续地发展起来。长期以来,乌克兰的情报机构一直被认为已遭俄罗斯彻底破坏。但如今,乌克兰已成为华盛顿对抗克里姆林宫最重要的情报合作伙伴之一。

2014年,马来西亚航空公司17号航班在乌克兰上空被击落,造成近300人死亡。
2014年,马来西亚航空公司17号航班在乌克兰上空被击落,造成近300人死亡。 Mauricio Lima for The New York Times
乌克兰人还帮助美国官员追查干预特朗普和希拉里·克林顿2016年美国总统大选的俄罗斯特工。
乌克兰人还帮助美国官员追查干预特朗普和希拉里·克林顿2016年美国总统大选的俄罗斯特工。 Damon Winter/The New York Times


The listening post in the Ukrainian forest is part of a C.I.A.-supported network of spy bases constructed in the past eight years that includes 12 secret locations along the Russian border. Before the war, the Ukrainians proved themselves to the Americans by collecting intercepts that helped prove Russia’s involvement in the 2014 downing of a commercial jetliner, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. The Ukrainians also helped the Americans go after the Russian operatives who meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
乌克兰森林里的监听站是中情局支持的间谍基地网络的一部分,这个网络是在过去八年里建立起来的,包括沿着俄罗斯边境的12个秘密地点。战前,乌克兰通过收集截获的情报向美国证明了自己的实力,这些情报帮助证明俄罗斯参与了2014年马来西亚航空公司17号航班被击落的事件。乌克兰人还帮助美国追查干预2016年美国总统大选的俄罗斯特工。


Around 2016, the C.I.A. began training an elite Ukrainian commando force — known as Unit 2245 — which captured Russian drones and communications gear so that C.I.A. technicians could reverse-engineer them and crack Moscow’s encryption systems. (One officer in the unit was Kyrylo Budanov, now the general leading Ukraine’s military intelligence.)
大约在2016年,中情局开始训练一支名为2245部队的乌克兰精英突击队,该部队缴获了俄罗斯的无人机和通信设备,以便中情局的技术人员对它们进行逆向工程,破解莫斯科的加密系统。(该部门的一名军官是凯里洛·布达诺夫,他现在是领导乌克兰军事情报部门的将军。)

And the C.I.A. also helped train a new generation of Ukrainian spies who operated inside Russia, across Europe, and in Cuba and other places where the Russians have a large presence.
中情局还帮助培训了新一代乌克兰间谍,他们在俄罗斯境内、欧洲各地、古巴和其他有大量俄罗斯人的地方开展活动。


The relationship is so ingrained that C.I.A. officers remained at a remote location in western Ukraine when the Biden administration evacuated U.S. personnel in the weeks before Russia invaded in February 2022. During the invasion, the officers relayed critical intelligence, including where Russia was planning strikes and which weapons systems they would use.
这是一种深度的关联,以至于当拜登政府在2022年2月俄罗斯入侵前几周撤离美国人员时,中情局官员仍留在乌克兰西部一个偏远的地方。在入侵期间,这些军官传递了关键情报,包括俄罗斯计划在哪里发动袭击,以及他们将使用哪些武器系统。


“Without them, there would have been no way for us to resist the Russians, or to beat them,” said Ivan Bakanov, who was then head of Ukraine’s domestic intelligence agency, the S.B.U.
“没有他们,我们就不可能抵抗俄罗斯人,也不可能打败他们,”当时担任乌克兰国内情报机构SBU局长的伊万·巴卡诺夫说。

2022年入侵后第二天,哈尔科夫一名死去的俄罗斯士兵。
2022年入侵后第二天,哈尔科夫一名死去的俄罗斯士兵。 Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
在2022年入侵后的第二天,乌克兰人在清理基辅南部一座住宅楼被导弹击中后的碎片。
在2022年入侵后的第二天,乌克兰人在清理基辅南部一座住宅楼被导弹击中后的碎片。 Lynsey Addario for The New York Times


The details of this intelligence partnership, many of which are being disclosed by The New York Times for the first time, have been a closely guarded secret for a decade.
这种情报合作关系十年来一直是严守的秘密,如今,其中许多细节由《纽约时报》首次披露。


In more than 200 interviews, current and former officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe described a partnership that nearly foundered from mutual distrust before it steadily expanded, turning Ukraine into an intelligence-gathering hub that intercepted more Russian communications than the C.I.A. station in Kyiv could initially handle. Many of the officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence and matters of sensitive diplomacy.
在200多次采访中,乌克兰、美国和欧洲的现任和前任官员描述了一种伙伴关系,这种关系一度几乎因为相互不信任而破裂,后来才稳步扩大,把乌克兰变成了一个情报收集中心,其截获的俄罗斯通信之多,一开始超出了中央情报局基辅情报站的处理能力。由于是在讨论情报和敏感的外交事务,许多官员要求匿名。


Now these intelligence networks are more important than ever, as Russia is on the offensive and Ukraine is more dependent on sabotage and long-range missile strikes that require spies far behind enemy lines. And they are increasingly at risk: If Republicans in Congress end military funding to Kyiv, the C.I.A. may have to scale back.
现在,这些情报网络比以往任何时候都更加重要,因为俄罗斯采取了攻势,乌克兰则更依赖于破坏和远程导弹袭击,这需要远在敌后的间谍。而这些网络正面临着越来越大的风险:如果国会中的共和党人停止向基辅提供军事资金,中情局可能不得不缩减规模。

To try to reassure Ukrainian leaders, William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, made a secret visit to Ukraine last Thursday, his 10th visit since the invasion.
为了安抚乌克兰领导人,中情局局长威廉·伯恩斯上周四秘密访问了乌克兰,这是他自入侵以来的第十次访问。


From the outset, a shared adversary — President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia — brought the C.I.A. and its Ukrainian partners together. Obsessed with “losing” Ukraine to the West, Mr. Putin had regularly interfered in Ukraine’s political system, handpicking leaders he believed would keep Ukraine within Russia’s orbit, yet each time it backfired, driving protesters into the streets.
从一开始,一个共同的对手——俄罗斯总统普京——就把中情局和乌克兰合作伙伴拉到了一起。普京一心要避免乌克兰被西方“抢去”,经常干预乌克兰的政治体制,精心挑选他认为会让乌克兰留在俄罗斯轨道内的领导人,但每次都适得其反,导致抗议者走上街头。


Mr. Putin has long blamed Western intelligence agencies for manipulating Kyiv and sowing anti-Russia sentiment in Ukraine.
普京长期以来一直指责西方情报机构操纵基辅,在乌克兰煽动反俄情绪。


Toward the end of 2021, according to a senior European official, Mr. Putin was weighing whether to launch his full-scale invasion when he met with the head of one of Russia’s main spy services, who told him that the C.I.A., together with Britain’s MI6, were controlling Ukraine and turning it into a beachhead for operations against Moscow.
据一名欧洲高级官员称,2021年底前,普京正在考虑是否发动全面入侵,当时他会见了俄罗斯主要间谍机构之一的负责人,后者告诉他,中情局和英国军情六处正在控制乌克兰,并将其变成针对莫斯科的行动的桥头堡。


But the Times investigation found that Mr. Putin and his advisers misread a critical dynamic. The C.I.A. didn’t push its way into Ukraine. U.S. officials were often reluctant to fully engage, fearing that Ukrainian officials could not be trusted, and worrying about provoking the Kremlin.
但时报的调查发现,普京及其顾问误读了一个关键动态。中情局没有强行进入乌克兰。美国官员往往不愿完全参与,他们担心乌克兰官员不可信,也担心会激怒克里姆林宫。

瓦列里·孔德拉蒂乌克是乌克兰军事情报机构的前指挥官。
瓦列里·孔德拉蒂乌克是乌克兰军事情报机构的前指挥官。 Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times
乌克兰更依赖于破坏和远程导弹袭击,这需要远在敌后的间谍。
乌克兰更依赖于破坏和远程导弹袭击,这需要远在敌后的间谍。 Ivor Prickett for The New York Times


Yet a tight circle of Ukrainian intelligence officials assiduously courted the C.I.A. and gradually made themselves vital to the Americans. In 2015, Gen. Valeriy Kondratiuk, then Ukraine’s head of military intelligence, arrived at a meeting with the C.I.A.’s deputy station chief and without warning handed over a stack of top-secret files.
然而,一个由乌克兰情报官员组成的小圈子竭力讨好中情局,并逐渐让自己成为美国人眼中的关键人物。2015年,时任乌克兰军事情报部门负责人瓦列里·孔德拉蒂乌克上将在与中情局副站长的会面中,毫无预兆地交出了一堆绝密文件。


That initial tranche contained secrets about the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet, including detailed information about the latest Russian nuclear submarine designs. Before long, teams of C.I.A. officers were regularly leaving his office with backpacks full of documents.
最初的那批文件涉及俄罗斯海军北方舰队的机密,包括俄罗斯最新核潜艇设计的详细信息。没过多久,中情局特工团队就经常带着装满文件的背包离开他的办公室。

“We understood that we needed to create the conditions of trust,” General Kondratiuk said.
“我们明白,我们需要创造信任的条件,”孔德拉蒂乌克说。


As the partnership deepened after 2016, the Ukrainians became impatient with what they considered Washington’s undue caution, and began staging assassinations and other lethal operations, which violated the terms the White House thought the Ukrainians had agreed to. Infuriated, officials in Washington threatened to cut off support, but they never did.
2016年之后,随着双方伙伴关系的加深,乌克兰人对他们心目中华盛顿过于谨慎的做法感到不耐烦,开始发动暗杀和其他致命行动,这些行动与白宫以为乌克兰人已经同意的条件相悖。愤怒的华盛顿官员威胁要切断援助,但他们从未这样做。


“The relationships only got stronger and stronger because both sides saw value in it, and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv — our station there, the operation out of Ukraine — became the best source of information, signals and everything else, on Russia,” said a former senior American official. “We couldn’t get enough of it.”
“双方的关系越来越牢固,因为双方都看到了合作的价值。美国驻基辅大使馆——我们在那里的基地,我们在乌克兰的行动——成为了有关俄罗斯的信息、信号和其他所有信息的最佳来源,”一名前美国高级官员说。“我们根本看不够。”


This is the untold story of how it all happened.
关于这一切的发生,是一个不为人知的故事。


A Cautious Beginning
谨慎的开始


The C.I.A.’s partnership in Ukraine can be traced back to two phone calls on the night of Feb. 24, 2014, eight years to the day before Russia’s full-scale invasion.
中情局在乌克兰的合作关系可以追溯到2014年2月24日晚的两通通话,也就是俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰的整整八年前。

Millions of Ukrainians had just overrun the country’s pro-Kremlin government and the president, Viktor Yanukovych, and his spy chiefs had fled to Russia. In the tumult, a fragile pro-Western government quickly took power.
当时,数百万乌克兰人刚刚推翻了亲克里姆林宫的政府,总统维克托·亚努科维奇和他的情报头目逃往俄罗斯。混乱中,一个脆弱的亲西方政府迅速掌权。


The government’s new spy chief, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, arrived at the headquarters of the domestic intelligence agency and found a pile of smoldering documents in the courtyard. Inside, many of the computers had been wiped or were infected with Russian malware.
政府的新任情报负责人瓦连京·纳利瓦伊琴科来到国内情报机构总部,在院子里,他发现了一堆正在焚烧的文件。在室内,许多电脑上的数据已经删除,或感染了俄罗斯的恶意软件。


“It was empty. No lights. No leadership. Nobody was there,” Mr. Nalyvaichenko said in an interview.
“里面空无一人。没有灯光。没有负责人。没有人在场,”纳利瓦伊琴科在接受采访时说。


He went to an office and called the C.I.A. station chief and the local head of MI6. It was near midnight but he summoned them to the building, asked for help in rebuilding the agency from the ground up, and proposed a three-way partnership. “That’s how it all started,” Mr. Nalyvaichenko said.
他来到一间办公室,打电话给美国的中情局和英国的军情六处驻当地的负责人。当时已近午夜,但他把他们召集到大楼里,请求他们帮忙从头开始重建该机构,并提议建立三方合作伙伴关系。“事情就是这样开始的,”纳利瓦伊琴科说。

2014年2月,乌克兰首都基辅的独立广场,当时民众抗议推翻了亲俄的总统。
2014年2月,乌克兰首都基辅的独立广场,当时民众抗议推翻了亲俄的总统。 Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times
在基辅独立广场举行的葬礼上,人们举起点亮的手机,摄于2014年。
在基辅独立广场举行的葬礼上,人们举起点亮的手机,摄于2014年。 Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times


The situation quickly became more dangerous. Mr. Putin seized Crimea. His agents fomented separatist rebellions that would become a war in the country’s east. Ukraine was on war footing, and Mr. Nalyvaichenko appealed to the C.I.A. for overhead imagery and other intelligence to help defend its territory.
局势很快变得更加危险了。普京夺取了克里米亚。他的代理人煽动分离主义叛乱,最终在该国东部引发了一场战争。乌克兰处于战争状态,纳利瓦伊琴科请求中情局提供高空图像和其他情报,帮助乌克兰捍卫领土。


With violence escalating, an unmarked U.S. government plane touched down at an airport in Kyiv carrying John O. Brennan, then the director of the C.I.A. He told Mr. Nalyvaichenko that the C.I.A. was interested in developing a relationship but only at a pace the agency was comfortable with, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.
随着暴力的升级,一架没有标识的美国政府专机降落在基辅机场,机上载有时任美国中情局局长的约翰·布伦南。据美国和乌克兰官员称,他告诉纳利瓦伊琴科,中情局有兴趣与之发展关系,但只能以其能接受的步调进行。


To the C.I.A., the unknown question was how long Mr. Nalyvaichenko and the pro-Western government would be around. The C.I.A. had been burned before in Ukraine.
对中情局来说,未知的问题是纳利瓦伊琴科和乌克兰的亲西方政府还能存在多久。中情局之前在乌克兰吃过亏。


Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine gained independence and then veered between competing political forces: those that wanted to remain close to Moscow and those that wanted to align with the West. During a previous stint as spy chief, Mr. Nalyvaichenko started a similar partnership with the C.I.A., which dissolved when the country swung back toward Russia.
1991年苏联解体后,乌克兰获得独立,随后在相互竞争的政治力量之间摇摆不定:一派希望与莫斯科保持密切关系,另一派则希望与西方结盟。在之前担任情报部门负责人期间,纳利瓦伊琴科与美国中情局建立了类似的合作关系,但当乌克兰重新向俄罗斯靠拢时,这种合作关系也随之解体。


Now Mr. Brennan explained that to unlock C.I.A. assistance the Ukrainians had to prove that they could provide intelligence of value to the Americans. They also needed to purge Russian spies; the domestic spy agency, the S.B.U., was riddled with them. (Case in point: The Russians quickly learned about Mr. Brennan’s supposedly secret visit. The Kremlin’s propaganda outlets published a photoshopped image of the C.I.A. director wearing a clown wig and makeup.)
布伦南解释说,现在要获得中情局的援助,乌克兰人必须证明他们可以向美国人提供有价值的情报。他们还需要清除俄罗斯间谍;乌克兰国内的情报机构国家安全局(SBU)里到处都是他们的身影。(例如俄罗斯人很快就知道了布伦南所谓的秘密访问。克里姆林宫的宣传机构发布了一张PS过的中情局局长化了妆、戴着小丑假发的照片。)


Mr. Brennan returned to Washington, where advisers to President Barack Obama were deeply concerned about provoking Moscow. The White House crafted secret rules that infuriated the Ukrainians and that some inside the C.I.A. thought of as handcuffs. The rules barred intelligence agencies from providing any support to Ukraine that could be “reasonably expected” to have lethal consequences.
布伦南回到华盛顿后,奥巴马总统的顾问对挑衅莫斯科深感担忧。白宫制定了秘密的规则,这激怒了乌克兰人,而中情局内部的一些人则认为这是一种束缚。这些规定禁止情报机构向乌克兰提供任何“合理预期”会造成致命后果的支持。

戴着面罩的俄罗斯士兵在克里米亚佩雷瓦尔诺的一个乌克兰军事基地站岗,摄于2014年。
戴着面罩的俄罗斯士兵在克里米亚佩雷瓦尔诺的一个乌克兰军事基地站岗,摄于2014年。 Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times
马来西亚航空公司17号航班的残骸,摄于2014年。
马来西亚航空公司17号航班的残骸,摄于2014年。 Mauricio Lima for The New York Times


The result was a delicate balancing act. The C.I.A. was supposed to strengthen Ukraine’s intelligence agencies without provoking the Russians. The red lines were never precisely clear, which created a persistent tension in the partnership.
结果导致了一种微妙的平衡。中情局本应在不激怒俄罗斯的情况下加强乌克兰的情报机构。但红线从来都不明确,这导致双方的合作关系持续紧张。


In Kyiv, Mr. Nalyvaichenko picked a longtime aide, General Kondratiuk, to serve as head of counterintelligence, and they created a new paramilitary unit that was deployed behind enemy lines to conduct operations and gather intelligence that the C.I.A. or MI6 would not provide to them.
在基辅,纳利瓦伊琴科挑选了他的老搭档孔德拉蒂乌克担任反间谍部门的负责人,他们创建了一个新的准军事单位,在敌人的后方开展行动,收集中情局或军情六处不会提供给他们的情报。


Known as the Fifth Directorate, this unit would be filled with officers born after Ukraine gained independence.
这支部队被称为第五局,成员都是乌克兰独立后出生的军人。


“They had no connection with Russia,” General Kondratiuk said. “They didn’t even know what the Soviet Union was.”
“他们与俄罗斯没有任何联系,”孔德拉蒂乌克说。“他们甚至不知道苏联是什么。”


That summer, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, blew up in midair and crashed in eastern Ukraine, killing nearly 300 passengers and crew. The Fifth Directorate produced telephone intercepts and other intelligence within hours of the crash that quickly placed responsibility on Russian-backed separatists.
那年夏天,从阿姆斯特丹飞往吉隆坡的马来西亚航空公司17航班在乌克兰东部爆炸坠毁,近300名乘客和机组人员遇难。第五局成员在坠机几小时后就拿出了电话窃听记录和其他情报,并迅速指出俄罗斯支持的分离主义分子要对此负责。


The C.I.A. was impressed, and made its first meaningful commitment by providing secure communications gear and specialized training to members of the Fifth Directorate and two other elite units.
这给中情局留下了不错的印象,并首次做出了有效的承诺,为第五局和其他两个精英单位的成员提供安全通讯设备和专业培训。


“The Ukrainians wanted fish and we, for policy reasons, couldn’t deliver that fish,” said a former U.S. official, referring to intelligence that could help them battle the Russians. “But we were happy to teach them how to fish and deliver fly-fishing equipment.”
“乌克兰人想要鱼,但出于政策原因,我们无法提供那条鱼,”一名前美国官员说道,鱼指的是可以帮助他们对抗俄罗斯的情报。“但是我们很乐意教他们如何捕鱼,并提供飞钓装备。”


A Secret Santa
秘密圣诞老人


In the summer of 2015, Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, shook up the domestic service and installed an ally to replace Mr. Nalyvaichenko, the C.I.A.’s trusted partner. But the change created an opportunity elsewhere.
2015年夏天,时任乌克兰总统彼得罗·波罗申科调整了国内情报部门,并安排了一位盟友来取代中情局信赖的合作伙伴纳利瓦伊琴科。但这一变化在别处创造了机会。


In the reshuffle, General Kondratiuk was appointed as the head of the country’s military intelligence agency, known as the HUR, where years earlier he had started his career. It would be an early example of how personal ties, more than policy shifts, would deepen the C.I.A.’s involvement in Ukraine.
在这次调整中,孔德拉蒂乌克被任命为乌克兰军事情报机构HUR的负责人,他多年前在这个部门开启了职业生涯。这是一个早期的例子,说明个人关系比政策转变更能加深中情局对乌克兰的介入。


Unlike the domestic agency, the HUR had the authority to collect intelligence outside the country, including in Russia. But the Americans had seen little value in cultivating the agency because it wasn’t producing any intelligence of value on the Russians — and because it was seen as a bastion of Russian sympathizers.
与国内情报机构不同的是,HUR有权收集国外情报,包括俄罗斯境内的情报。但美国人认为培养该机构的价值不大,因为它没有提供任何关于俄罗斯的有价值情报,而且它被视为亲俄罗斯人士的堡垒。


Trying to build trust, General Kondratiuk arranged a meeting with his American counterpart at the Defense Intelligence Agency and handed over a stack of secret Russian documents. But senior D.I.A. officials were suspicious and discouraged building closer ties.
为了建立信任,孔德拉蒂乌克安排了一次与美国国防情报局官员的会面,并交给他们了一叠俄罗斯秘密文件。但国防情报局的高级官员仍心存疑虑,不鼓励建立更密切的联系。


The general needed to find a more willing partner.
孔德拉蒂乌克需要找到一个更愿意合作的伙伴。

Months earlier, while still with the domestic agency, General Kondratiuk visited the C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va. In those meetings, he met a C.I.A. officer with a jolly demeanor and a bushy beard who had been tapped to become the next station chief in Kyiv.
几个月前还在国内机构就任的孔德拉蒂乌克访问了位于弗吉尼亚州兰利的中情局总部。在这些会面中,他遇到了一位举止风趣、胡须浓密的中情局官员,此人当时已被任命为下一任基辅情报站站长。

中央情报局在弗吉尼亚州兰利的总部。
中央情报局在弗吉尼亚州兰利的总部。 Charles Ommanney/Getty Images
曾任乌克兰外交部副部长、乌克兰安全局局长的瓦连京·纳利瓦伊琴科本月在基辅。
曾任乌克兰外交部副部长、乌克兰安全局局长的瓦连京·纳利瓦伊琴科本月在基辅。 Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times


After a long day of meetings, the C.I.A. took General Kondratiuk to a Washington Capitals hockey match, where he and the incoming station chief sat in a luxury box and loudly booed Alex Ovechkin, the team’s star player from Russia.
经过一天漫长的会议,中情局带着孔德拉蒂乌克去看了一场华盛顿首都队的冰球比赛,他和那位即将上任的基辅情报站站长坐在豪华包厢里,对来自俄罗斯的明星球员亚历克斯·奥维契金发出嘘声。


The station chief had not yet arrived when General Kondratiuk handed over to the C.I.A. the secret documents about the Russian Navy. “There’s more where this came from,” he promised, and the documents were sent off to analysts in Langley.
当孔德拉蒂乌克把有关俄罗斯海军的秘密文件交给中情局时,那位站长都还没抵达基辅。孔德拉蒂乌克承诺说:“还会有更多东西。”文件被送到了兰利的分析人员那里。


The analysts concluded the documents were authentic, and after the station chief arrived in Kyiv, the C.I.A. became General Kondratiuk’s primary partner.
分析人员判断这些文件是真实的,在那位站长抵达基辅后,中情局就成了孔德拉蒂乌克的主要合作伙伴。


General Kondratiuk knew he needed the C.I.A. to strengthen his own agency. The C.I.A. thought the general might be able to help Langley, too. It struggled to recruit spies inside Russia because its case officers were under heavy surveillance.
孔德拉蒂乌克知道,他需要中情局来加强本国的机构。中情局认为这位将军或许也能帮助它们。因为中情局的办案人员受到严密监视,很难在俄罗斯境内招募间谍。


“For a Russian, allowing oneself to be recruited by an American is to commit the absolute, ultimate in treachery and treason,” General Kondratiuk said. “But for a Russian to be recruited by a Ukrainian, it’s just friends talking over a beer.”
“对俄罗斯人来说,允许自己被美国人招募绝对是最严重的背叛和叛国行为,”孔德拉蒂乌克说。“但被乌克兰人招募只不过是朋友间喝啤酒聊聊天罢了。”


The new station chief began regularly visiting General Kondratiuk, whose office was decorated with an aquarium where yellow and blue fish — the national colors of Ukraine — swam circles around a model of a sunken Russian submarine. The two men became close, which drove the relationship between the two agencies, and the Ukrainians gave the new station chief an affectionate nickname: Santa Claus.
新站长开始定期拜访孔德拉蒂乌克,后者的办公室里摆放着一个水族箱,里面黄色和蓝色——乌克兰国旗色——的鱼在一艘沉没的俄罗斯潜艇模型周围游来游去。两人的关系变得密切,这也促进了两个机构之间的关系。乌克兰人还给新站长起了一个亲切的绰号:圣诞老人。


In January 2016, General Kondratiuk flew to Washington for meetings at Scattergood, an estate on the C.I.A. campus in Virginia where the agency often fetes visiting dignitaries. The agency agreed to help the HUR modernize, and to improve its ability to intercept Russian military communications. In exchange, General Kondratiuk agreed to share all of the raw intelligence with the Americans.
2016年1月,孔德拉蒂乌克飞抵华盛顿,在弗吉尼亚州中情局园区内的斯卡特古德庄园开会,该机构经常在这里接待来访的贵宾。中情局同意帮助HUR实现现代化,并提高其拦截俄罗斯军事通信的能力。作为交换,孔德拉蒂乌克同意与美国人分享所有原始情报。


Now the partnership was real.
一场真正意义上的合作开始了。


Operation Goldfish
金鱼行动


Today, the narrow road leading to the secret base is framed by minefields, seeded as a line of defense in the weeks after Russia’s invasion. The Russian missiles that hit the base had seemingly shut it down, but just weeks later the Ukrainians returned.
如今,通往秘密基地的狭窄道路布满了雷区,这是俄罗斯入侵几周后乌克兰布置的一道防线。俄罗斯导弹曾击中该基地,似乎迫使其关闭了一段时间,但几周后,乌克兰人就回来了。


With money and equipment provided by the C.I.A., crews under General Dvoretskiy’s command began to rebuild, but underground. To avoid detection, they only worked at night and when Russian spy satellites were not overhead. Workers also parked their cars a distance away from the construction site.
借助中情局提供的资金和设备,德沃雷茨基手下的人开始进行重建,不过是秘密进行的。为了避免被发现,他们只在夜间以及俄罗斯间谍卫星不在头顶时工作。工人们还会把车停在离工地较远的地方。


In the bunker, General Dvoretskiy pointed to communications equipment and large computer servers, some of which were financed by the C.I.A. He said his teams were using the base to hack into the Russian military’s secure communications networks.
在地堡里,德沃雷茨基指着通讯设备和巨大的计算机服务器,其中一些是由中情局资助的。他说,他的团队正在利用该基地侵入俄罗斯军方的加密通信网络。


“This is the thing that breaks into satellites and decodes secret conversations,” General Dvoretskiy told a Times journalist on a tour, adding that they were hacking into spy satellites from China and Belarus, too.
“这是侵入卫星并破译秘密对话的东西,”德沃雷茨基在带着《纽约时报》记者参观时说。他还说他们侵入了中国和白俄罗斯的间谍卫星。


Another officer placed two recently produced maps on a table, as evidence of how Ukraine is tracking Russian activity around the world.
另一名官员将两张最近制作的地图放在桌子上,作为乌克兰如何跟踪俄罗斯在世界各地活动的证据。


The first showed the overhead routes of Russian spy satellites traveling over central Ukraine. The second showed how Russian spy satellites are passing over strategic military installations — including a nuclear weapons facility — in the eastern and central United States.
第一张显示了俄罗斯间谍卫星在乌克兰中部上空经过的路线。第二张展示了俄罗斯间谍卫星如何飞越美国东部和中部的战略军事设施,包括一个核武器设施。

封锁了乌克兰哈尔科夫地区通往俄罗斯边境道路的一个军事检查站,上边有一个指示地雷的标志,摄于去年12月。
封锁了乌克兰哈尔科夫地区通往俄罗斯边境道路的一个军事检查站,上边有一个指示地雷的标志,摄于去年12月。 David Guttenfelder for The New York Times
乌克兰警察在靠近俄罗斯边境的乌克兰哈尔科夫地区设立的一个流动检查站,摄于去年12月。
乌克兰警察在靠近俄罗斯边境的乌克兰哈尔科夫地区设立的一个流动检查站,摄于去年12月。 David Guttenfelder for The New York Times


The C.I.A. began sending equipment in 2016, after the pivotal meeting at Scattergood, General Dvoretskiy said, providing encrypted radios and devices for intercepting secret enemy communications.
德沃雷茨基表示,在斯卡特古德的关键会议后,中情局于2016年开始交付设备,提供加密无线电和用于拦截敌方秘密通信的设备。


Beyond the base, the C.I.A. also oversaw a training program, carried out in two European cities, to teach Ukrainian intelligence officers how to convincingly assume fake personas and steal secrets in Russia and other countries that are adept at rooting out spies. The program was called Operation Goldfish, which derived from a joke about a Russian-speaking goldfish who offers two Estonians wishes in exchange for its freedom.
除了基地之外,中情局还负责了一项在两个欧洲城市开展的培训计划,教授乌克兰情报官员如何令人信服地扮演假身份,在俄罗斯和其他善于根除间谍的国家窃取机密。该计划被称为“金鱼行动”,这源自一个笑话:一条讲俄语的金鱼向两个爱沙尼亚人许诺满足他们的愿望,以换取自己的自由。


The punchline was that one of the Estonians bashed the fish’s head with a rock, explaining that anything speaking Russian could not be trusted.
在笑话最后,其中一个爱沙尼亚人用石头砸了金鱼的头,说道:任何讲俄语的东西都不可信。


The Operation Goldfish officers were soon deployed to 12 newly-built, forward operating bases constructed along the Russian border. From each base, General Kondratiuk said, the Ukrainian officers ran networks of agents who gathered intelligence inside Russia.
参与金鱼行动的军官很快被部署到沿俄罗斯边境新建的12个前沿作战基地。孔德拉蒂乌克说,乌克兰军官在每个基地都维护着收集俄罗斯境内情报的特工网络。


C.I.A. officers installed equipment at the bases to help gather intelligence and also identified some of the most skilled Ukrainian graduates of the Operation Goldfish program, working with them to approach potential Russian sources. These graduates then trained sleeper agents on Ukrainian territory meant to launch guerrilla operations in case of occupation.
中情局官员们在基地安装设备来帮助收集情报,还挑选出一些金鱼行动计划中最有能力的乌克兰毕业生,与他们合作去接近潜在的俄罗斯情报来源。这些毕业生随后在乌克兰领土上训练潜伏特工,以便在被占领时展开游击行动。


It can often take years for the C.I.A. to develop enough trust in a foreign agency to begin conducting joint operations. With the Ukrainians it had taken less than six months. The new partnership started producing so much raw intelligence about Russia that it had to be shipped to Langley for processing.
中情局通常需要数年时间才能完全信任一家外国机构,并开始与其开展联合行动。乌克兰人只花了不到六个月的时间就达成了这一点。这一新的合作伙伴关系开始生成大量有关俄罗斯的原始情报,以至于必须将它们运送到兰利进行处理。


But the C.I.A. did have red lines. It wouldn’t help the Ukrainians conduct offensive lethal operations.
但中央情报局确实是有一条红线的。他们不会帮助乌克兰人实施致命攻击行动。


“We made a distinction between intelligence collection operations and things that go boom,” a former senior U.S. official said.
“我们把情报收集行动和那些真刀真枪的事情分得很清楚,”一位前美国高级官员说。


‘This is Our Country’
“这是我们的国家”


It was a distinction that grated on the Ukrainians.
这个区分让乌克兰人感到很不满。


First, General Kondratiuk was annoyed when the Americans refused to provide satellite images from inside Russia. Soon after, he requested C.I.A. assistance in planning a clandestine mission to send HUR commandos into Russia to plant explosive devices at train depots used by the Russian military. If the Russian military sought to take more Ukrainian territory, Ukrainians could detonate the explosives to slow the Russian advance.
最初,当美国人拒绝提供俄罗斯境内的卫星图像时,孔德拉蒂乌克就很恼火。不久之后,他请求中情局协助策划一项秘密任务,派遣HUR突击队员进入俄罗斯,在俄军使用的火车站安放爆炸装置。如果俄罗斯军队试图夺取更多的乌克兰领土,乌克兰人就可以引爆炸药,以减缓俄罗斯的推进速度。


When the station chief briefed his superiors, they “lost their minds,” as one former official put it. Mr. Brennan, the C.I.A. director, called General Kondratiuk to make certain that mission was canceled and that Ukraine abided by the red lines forbidding lethal operations.
当基辅情报站站长向上级汇报后,用一位前官员的说法,他们“简直要疯了”。中情局局长布伦南给孔德拉蒂乌克打了电话,确保他们取消这次任务,并让乌克兰保证遵守禁止致命行动的红线。


General Kondratiuk canceled the mission, but he also took a different lesson. “Going forward, we worked to not have discussions about these things with your guys,” he said.
孔德拉蒂乌克取消了这次任务,但他也得到了不同的教训。他说:“今后,我们不会再与你们的人讨论这些事情。”


Late that summer, Ukrainian spies discovered that Russian forces were deploying attack helicopters at an airfield on the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula, possibly to stage a surprise attack.
那年夏末,乌克兰间谍发现俄军正在俄占克里米亚半岛的一个机场部署攻击直升机,可能是为了发动突然袭击。


General Kondratiuk decided to send a team into Crimea to plant explosives at the airfield so they could be detonated if Russia moved to attack.
孔德拉蒂乌克决定派遣一个小组进入克里米亚,在机场埋设炸药,以便在俄罗斯发动进攻时引爆。


This time, he didn’t ask the C.I.A. for permission. He turned to Unit 2245, the commando force that received specialized military training from the C.I.A.’s elite paramilitary group, known as the Ground Department. The intent of the training was to teach defensive techniques, but C.I.A. officers understood that without their knowledge the Ukrainians could use the same techniques in offensive lethal operations.
这一次,他没有征求中情局的同意,而是向2245部队求助,这支突击队接受了中情局的精英准军事组织——地面分队——的专门军事训练。训练的目的是传授防卫技术,但中情局的军官明白,在他们不知情的情况下,乌克兰人可以把这些技术用于进攻性致命行动。

时任乌克兰总统的彼得罗·波罗申科(右)和时任美国副总统的拜登在基辅举行会议,摄于2015年。
时任乌克兰总统的彼得罗·波罗申科(右)和时任美国副总统的拜登在基辅举行会议,摄于2015年。 Pool photo by Mikhail Palinchak
基辅的乌克兰军事情报机构负责人凯里洛·布达诺夫将军,摄于本月。
基辅的乌克兰军事情报机构负责人凯里洛·布达诺夫将军,摄于本月。 Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times


At the time, the future head of Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, General Budanov, was a rising star in Unit 2245. He was known for daring operations behind enemy lines and had deep ties to the C.I.A. The agency had trained him and also taken the extraordinary step of sending him for rehabilitation to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Maryland after he was shot in the right arm during fighting in the Donbas.
当时,乌克兰军事情报机构未来的负责人布达诺夫将军是2245部队里一颗冉冉升起的新星。他以大胆的敌后行动而闻名,与中情局关系密切。中情局对他进行过培训,而且当他在顿巴斯战斗中右臂中弹后,还非同寻常地将他送往马里兰州沃尔特里德国家军事医疗中心接受康复治疗。


Disguised in Russian uniforms, then-Lt. Col. Budanov led commandos across a narrow gulf in inflatable speedboats, landing at night in Crimea.
当时还是中校的布达诺夫伪装成俄罗斯士兵,带领突击队员乘坐充气快艇穿越狭窄的海湾,在夜间登陆克里米亚。


But an elite Russian commando unit was waiting for them. The Ukrainians fought back, killing several Russian fighters, including the son of a general, before retreating to the shoreline, plunging into the sea and swimming for hours to Ukrainian-controlled territory.
然而,一支精锐的俄罗斯突击队等着他们。乌克兰人发起反击,打死了几名俄罗斯战士,包括一名将军的儿子,然后撤退到海岸线,跳入海中,游了几个小时才回到乌克兰控制的领土。


It was a disaster. In a public address, President Putin accused the Ukrainians of plotting a terrorist attack and promised to avenge the deaths of the Russian fighters.
这是一场灾难。普京总统在一次公开讲话中指责乌克兰人策划恐怖袭击,并承诺为牺牲的俄罗斯战士复仇。


“There is no doubt that we will not let these things pass,” he said.
“不用怀疑,我们不会让这些事就这么过去的,”他说。


In Washington, the Obama White House was livid. Joseph R. Biden Jr., then the vice president and a champion of assistance to Ukraine, called Ukraine’s president to angrily complain.
在华盛顿,奥巴马政府怒不可遏。时任副总统、援助乌克兰的倡导者拜登打电话给乌克兰总统,愤怒地抱怨了一番。


“It causes a gigantic problem,” Mr. Biden said in the call, a recording of which was leaked and published online. “All I’m telling you as a friend is that my making arguments here is a hell of a lot harder now.”
拜登在电话中说:“这造成了一个巨大的问题。”这段电话录音被泄露并公布到了网上。“作为朋友,我想告诉你的是,现在我在这里替你们争取要难得多了。”


Some of Mr. Obama’s advisers wanted to shut the C.I.A. program down, but Mr. Brennan persuaded them that doing so would be self-defeating, given the relationship was starting to produce intelligence on the Russians as the C.I.A. was investigating Russian election meddling.
奥巴马的一些顾问曾想关闭这个中情局项目,但布伦南说服了他们这样做只会弄巧成拙,因为在中情局调查俄罗斯干预选举的同时,这种合作关系已经开始带来针对俄罗斯的情报。


Mr. Brennan got on the phone with General Kondratiuk to again emphasize the red lines.
布伦南在电话中再次向孔德拉蒂乌克强调了遵守红线的重要性。


The general was upset. “This is our country,” he responded, according to a colleague. “It’s our war, and we’ve got to fight.”
孔德拉蒂乌克很不满。一名同僚透露,他回复道:“这是我们的国家。这是我们的战争,我们必须战斗。”


The blowback from Washington cost General Kondratiuk his job. But Ukraine didn’t back down.
华盛顿的负面反应让孔德拉蒂乌克丢了饭碗。但乌克兰没有退缩。

亲俄叛军指挥官、人称“摩托罗拉”的阿尔谢尼·帕夫洛夫在参加乌克兰东部顿涅茨克的阅兵式时敬礼,摄于2016年。
亲俄叛军指挥官、人称“摩托罗拉”的阿尔谢尼·帕夫洛夫在参加乌克兰东部顿涅茨克的阅兵式时敬礼,摄于2016年。 Oleksii Filippov/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
警方官员检查马克西姆·沙波瓦尔的汽车的残骸,他在基辅2017年的一次爆炸中丧生。
警方官员检查马克西姆·沙波瓦尔的汽车的残骸,他在基辅2017年的一次爆炸中丧生。 Sergii Kharchenko/Pacific Press, via LightRocket, via Getty Images


One day after General Kondratiuk was removed, a mysterious explosion in the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk, in eastern Ukraine, ripped through an elevator carrying a senior Russian separatist commander named Arsen Pavlov, known by his nom de guerre, Motorola.
就在孔德拉蒂乌克被撤职的第二天,乌克兰东部被俄罗斯占领的顿涅茨克市发生了一起神秘的爆炸事件,一个电梯被炸毁,一个名叫阿尔谢尼·帕夫洛夫的俄罗斯分裂主义高级指挥官在电梯内,他以别名“摩托罗拉”为人所知。


The C.I.A. soon learned that the assassins were members of the Fifth Directorate, the spy group that received C.I.A. training. Ukraine’s domestic intelligence agency had even handed out commemorative patches to those involved, each one stitched with the word “Lift,” the British term for an elevator.
中情局很快发现行刺者是第五局的人,这个间谍组织接受过中情局训练。乌克兰国内情报机构甚至向参与人员发放了纪念布章,每个布章上都缝着“Lift”,这是英式英语里电梯的叫法。


Again, some of Mr. Obama’s advisers were furious, but they were lame ducks — the presidential election pitting Donald J. Trump against Hillary Rodham Clinton was three weeks away — and the assassinations continued.
奥巴马的一些顾问又一次勃然大怒,但他们都是“跛脚鸭”——当时距离特朗普对阵希拉里的总统大选还有三个星期——而暗杀行动仍在继续。


A team of Ukrainian agents set up an unmanned, shoulder-fired rocket launcher in a building in the occupied territories. It was directly across from the office of a rebel commander named Mikhail Tolstykh, better known as Givi. Using a remote trigger, they fired the launcher as soon as Givi entered his office, killing him, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.
在被占领土的一栋大楼里,一个乌克兰特工小队设置了一个无人操纵的肩射火箭发射器。它正对着一个名叫米哈伊尔·托尔斯特赫(又名吉维)的叛军指挥官的办公室。据美国和乌克兰官员称,特工使用遥控扳机,在吉维进入办公室后立即发射了火箭将其击毙。


A shadow war was now in overdrive. The Russians used a car bomb to assassinate the head of Unit 2245, the elite Ukrainian commando force. The commander, Col. Maksim Shapoval, was on his way to meeting with C.I.A. officers in Kyiv when his car exploded.
一场影子战争进入了白热化阶段。俄罗斯人用汽车炸弹暗杀了乌克兰精锐突击队2245部队的指挥官。在前往基辅与中情局官员会面的途中,指挥官马克西姆·沙波瓦尔上校乘坐的汽车突然爆炸。


At the colonel’s wake, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, stood in mourning beside the C.I.A. station chief. Later, C.I.A. officers and their Ukrainian counterparts toasted Colonel Shapoval with whiskey shots.
在他的守灵仪式上,美国驻乌克兰大使玛丽·约万诺维奇站在基辅办事处站长旁边一起默哀。随后,中情局官员和乌克兰官员用威士忌向沙波瓦尔上校致敬。


“For all of us,” General Kondratiuk said, “it was a blow.”
孔德拉蒂乌克说:“对我们所有人来说,那都是一次打击。”


Tiptoeing Around Trump
蹑手蹑脚地绕过特朗普


The election of Mr. Trump in November 2016 put the Ukrainians and their C.I.A. partners on edge.
特朗普2016年11月在美国大选中获胜,让乌克兰人和他们的中情局合作伙伴们紧张不安。


Mr. Trump praised Mr. Putin and dismissed Russia’s role in election interference. He was suspicious of Ukraine and later tried to pressure its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to investigate his Democratic rival, Mr. Biden, resulting in Mr. Trump’s first impeachment.
特朗普曾赞扬普京,否认俄罗斯在美国大选中起的干预作用。他不信任乌克兰,后来还曾试图向乌克兰总统泽连斯基施压,要求他调查特朗普的民主党竞争对手拜登,导致特朗普第一次遭到弹劾。


But whatever Mr. Trump said and did, his administration often went in the other direction. This is because Mr. Trump had put Russia hawks in key positions, including Mike Pompeo as C.I.A. director and John Bolton as national security adviser. They visited Kyiv to underline their full support for the secret partnership, which expanded to include more specialized training programs and the building of additional secret bases.
但不管特朗普说什么、做什么,他的政府常常与他各行其是。这是因为特朗普把对俄罗斯强硬的人放在了关键位置上,包括担任中央情报局局长的迈克·庞皮欧和担任总统国家安全事务助理的约翰·博尔顿。两人访问了基辅,以强调他们对秘密伙伴关系的全力支持,并把这种关系扩大到了包括更专门的培训计划和建设更多秘密基地方面。


The base in the forest grew to include a new command center and barracks, and swelled from 80 to 800 Ukrainian intelligence officers. Preventing Russia from interfering in future U.S. elections was a top C.I.A. priority during this period, and Ukrainian and American intelligence officers joined forces to probe the computer systems of Russia’s intelligence agencies to identify operatives trying to manipulate voters.
森林中的基地扩大后包括一个新的指挥中心和营房,在那里工作的乌克兰情报官员人数从80名增加到了800名。在那段时间,防止俄罗斯干预未来的美国选举是中情局的当务之急。乌克兰和美国的情报官员在探查俄罗斯情报机构的计算机系统上进行合作,以找出试图操纵选民的特工。

俄罗斯总统普京与时任美国总统特朗普交谈,摄于2017年。
俄罗斯总统普京与时任美国总统特朗普交谈,摄于2017年。 Stephen Crowley/The New York Times
时任美国国务卿的迈克·庞皮欧在基辅向乌克兰阵亡将士纪念碑献花,摄于2020年。
时任美国国务卿的迈克·庞皮欧在基辅向乌克兰阵亡将士纪念碑献花,摄于2020年。 Genya Savilov/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images


In one joint operation, a HUR team duped an officer from Russia’s military intelligence service into providing information that allowed the C.I.A. to connect Russia’s government to the so-called Fancy Bear hacking group, which had been linked to election interference efforts in a number of countries.
在一次联合行动中,HUR团队蒙骗了俄罗斯军事情报部门的一名官员,使其提供了信息,让中情局能将俄罗斯政府与名为Fancy Bear的黑客组织联系起来,该组织与许多国家的选举干预活动有关。


General Budanov, whom Mr. Zelensky tapped to lead the HUR in 2020, said of the partnership: “It only strengthened. It grew systematically. The cooperation expanded to additional spheres and became more large-scale.”
泽连斯基2020年任命布达诺夫领导HUR,后者在谈到这种伙伴关系时说:“它反而得到了加强。它已系统性地成长起来。合作的领域不断扩大,规模也变得更大。”


The relationship was so successful that the C.I.A. wanted to replicate it with other European intelligence services that shared a focus in countering Russia.
这种关系如此成功,以至于中情局希望与其他同样致力于打击俄罗斯的欧洲情报机构复制这种关系。


The head of Russia House, the C.I.A. department overseeing operations against Russia, organized a secret meeting at The Hague. There, representatives from the C.I.A., Britain’s MI6, the HUR, the Dutch service (a critical intelligence ally) and other agencies agreed to start pooling together more of their intelligence on Russia.
俄罗斯屋是中情局负责针对俄罗斯行动的部门,该部门的主管曾在海牙组织了一次秘密会议。来自中情局、英国军情六处、HUR、荷兰情报部门(一个重要的情报盟友),以及其他机构的代表们在会上同意共享更多有关俄罗斯的情报。


The result was a secret coalition against Russia — and the Ukrainians were vital members of it.
结果是形成了一个针对俄罗斯的秘密联盟,而乌克兰人则是其中的重要成员。


March to War
走向战争


In March 2021, the Russian military started massing troops along the border with Ukraine. As the months passed, and more troops encircled the country, the question was whether Mr. Putin was making a feint or preparing for war.
2021年3月,俄罗斯军方开始沿着俄乌边境集结部队。几个月后,乌克兰边境上集结的俄军越来越多,不清楚的是普京是在佯攻还是在为战争做准备。


That November, and in the weeks that followed, the C.I.A. and MI6 delivered a unified message to their Ukrainian partners: Russia was preparing for a full-scale invasion to decapitate the government and install a puppet in Kyiv who would do the Kremlin’s bidding.
在那年11月和接下来的几周里,中情局和军情六处向他们的乌克兰合作伙伴传递了一个统一的信息:俄罗斯正在准备全面入侵乌克兰,斩首乌克兰政府,在基辅设立一个听从克里姆林宫命令的傀儡政府。


U.S. and British intelligence agencies had intercepts that Ukrainian intelligence agencies did not have access to, according to U.S. officials. The new intelligence listed the names of Ukrainian officials whom the Russians were planning to kill or capture, as well as the Ukrainians the Kremlin hoped to install in power.
据美国官员说,美国和英国情报部门拦截到的信息是乌克兰的情报机构没能获得的。新情报中有俄罗斯打算杀死或抓获的乌克兰官员名单,也有克里姆林宫想扶植上台的乌克兰人名单。

俄罗斯入侵乌克兰几天前,俄罗斯自行榴弹炮正在俄罗斯塔甘罗格郊外的车站装载到火车上。
俄罗斯入侵乌克兰几天前,俄罗斯自行榴弹炮正在俄罗斯塔甘罗格郊外的车站装载到火车上。 The New York Times
乌克兰总统泽连斯基2022年3月在基辅举行的记者会上。
乌克兰总统泽连斯基2022年3月在基辅举行的记者会上。 Lynsey Addario for The New York Times


President Zelensky and some of his top advisers appeared unconvinced, even after Mr. Burns, the C.I.A. director, rushed to Kyiv in January 2022 to brief them.
泽连斯基和他的一些高级顾问们似乎不相信这个情报,甚至在中情局长伯恩斯2022年1月赶赴基辅向他们通报了情况之后。


As the Russian invasion neared, C.I.A. and MI6 officers made final visits in Kyiv with their Ukrainian peers. One of the M16 officers teared up in front of the Ukrainians, out of concern that the Russians would kill them.
俄罗斯快要入侵时,中情局和军情六处的官员们最后一次前往基辅与他们的乌克兰同行们见面。军情六处的一名官员在乌克兰人面前流下了眼泪,因为担心他们会被俄罗斯人杀死。


At Mr. Burns’s urging, a small group of C.I.A. officers were exempted from the broader U.S. evacuation and were relocated to a hotel complex in western Ukraine. They didn’t want to desert their partners.
在伯恩斯的催促下,一小部分中情局官员获得了美国人大批撤离乌克兰的豁免,他们搬进乌克兰西部的一个酒店建筑群。他们不想抛弃他们的伙伴。


No Endgame
没有终局


After Mr. Putin launched the invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the C.I.A. officers at the hotel were the only U.S. government presence on the ground. Every day at the hotel, they met with their Ukrainian contacts to pass information. The old handcuffs were off, and the Biden White House authorized spy agencies to provide intelligence support for lethal operations against Russian forces on Ukrainian soil.
普京2022年2月24日发动入侵后,美国政府在乌克兰的唯一存在是留在该酒店的中情局官员。他们每天在酒店与乌克兰联系人见面,向他们传递信息。以前的束缚已被取消,拜登的白宫已授权间谍机构提供情报支持,用于对付乌克兰领土上的俄军致命行动。


Often, the C.I.A. briefings contained shockingly specific details.
中情局的通报中常常包含惊人的具体细节。


On March 3, 2022 — the eighth day of the war — the C.I.A. team gave a precise overview of Russian plans for the coming two weeks. The Russians would open a humanitarian corridor out of the besieged city of Mariupol that same day, and then open fire on the Ukrainians who used it.
2022年3月3日,也就是战争爆发后的第八天,中情局的那个小组提供了俄罗斯未来两周行动计划的准确概述。同一天,俄罗斯人在被围困的马里乌波尔市外开辟了一条人道主义走廊,然后向使用该走廊的乌克兰人开火。


The Russians planned to encircle the strategic port city of Odesa, according to the C.I.A., but a storm delayed the assault and the Russians never took the city. Then, on March 10, the Russians intended to bombard six Ukrainian cities, and had already entered coordinates into cruise missiles for those strikes.
中情局称,俄罗斯人打算把战略港口城市敖德萨包围起来,但一场风暴推迟了进攻,俄罗斯部队从未占领该城。那之后的3月10日,俄罗斯曾打算对六个乌克兰城市进行轰炸,并已将为进行轰炸将坐标输入了巡航导弹的制导系统。


The Russians also were trying to assassinate top Ukrainian officials, including Mr. Zelensky. In at least one case, the C.I.A. shared intelligence with Ukraine’s domestic agency that helped disrupt a plot against the president, according to a senior Ukrainian official.
俄罗斯人还试图暗杀乌克兰高级官员,包括泽连斯基。据乌克兰的一名高级官员说,至少在一次情况中,中情局与乌克兰的国内机构分享了情报,帮助挫败了一起针对总统的阴谋。


When the Russian assault on Kyiv had stalled, the C.I.A. station chief rejoiced and told his Ukrainian counterparts that they were “punching the Russians in the face,” according to a Ukrainian officer who was in the room.
俄罗斯停止对基辅的进攻后,那位中情局情报站长非常高兴,他对一名乌克兰情报官员说,他们正在“用重拳打俄罗斯人的脸”。

乌克兰陆军的一名士兵在敖德萨的海滨阵地上做防守准备,摄于2022年。
乌克兰陆军的一名士兵在敖德萨的海滨阵地上做防守准备,摄于2022年。 Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
乌克兰将南部城市赫尔松从俄罗斯占领下夺回后聚集在一起领取食物的人群,摄于2022年。
乌克兰将南部城市赫尔松从俄罗斯占领下夺回后聚集在一起领取食物的人群,摄于2022年。 Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times


Within weeks, the C.I.A. had returned to Kyiv, and the agency sent in scores of new officers to help the Ukrainians. A senior U.S. official said of the C.I.A.’s sizable presence, “Are they pulling triggers? No. Are they helping with targeting? Absolutely.”
几周内,那个中情局小组回到了基辅,中情局还派了几十名新官员来帮助乌克兰人。美国一名高级官员谈到中情局在乌克兰相当规模的存在时说,“他们在扣动扳机吗?没有。他们在帮助确定目标吗?绝对是。”


Some of the C.I.A. officers were deployed to Ukrainian bases. They reviewed lists of potential Russian targets that the Ukrainians were preparing to strike, comparing the information that the Ukrainians had with U.S. intelligence to ensure that it was accurate.
新官员中的一些被部派到了乌克兰的基地。他们核查了乌克兰准备打击的潜在俄罗斯目标的名单,将乌克兰人掌握的信息与美国的情报进行比较,以确保其准确性。


Before the invasion, the C.I.A. and MI6 had trained their Ukrainian counterparts on recruiting sources, and building clandestine and partisan networks. In the southern Kherson region, which was occupied by Russia in the first weeks of the war, those partisan networks sprang into action, according to General Kondratiuk, assassinating local collaborators and helping Ukrainian forces target Russian positions.
在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之前,中情局和军情六处曾对乌克兰同行进行过培训,内容包括招募线人、建立秘密行动和游击队员网等。在战争的最初几周被俄罗斯占领的赫尔松南部地区,这些游击队员网迅速行动起来,孔德拉蒂乌克说,他们暗杀了与俄罗斯合作的当地人,还帮助乌克兰军队将炮火对准了俄罗斯军队的位置。


In July 2022, Ukrainian spies saw Russian convoys preparing to cross a strategic bridge across the Dnipro river and notified MI6. British and American intelligence officers then quickly verified the Ukrainian intelligence, using real-time satellite imagery. MI6 relayed the confirmation, and the Ukrainian military opened fire with rockets, destroying the convoys.
2022年7月,乌克兰间谍看到俄罗斯的车队在为穿过第聂伯河上的一座战略桥梁做准备,并告诉了军情六处。英国和美国的情报官员们随后用实时卫星图像迅速核实了乌克兰人的情报。军情六处将情报转达给了乌克兰军方,让其得以用火箭弹摧毁了俄罗斯的车队。


At the underground bunker, General Dvoretskiy said a German antiaircraft system now defends against Russian attacks. An air-filtration system guards against chemical weapons and a dedicated power system is available, if the power grid goes down.
在地堡里,德沃雷茨基说,现在有一个防御俄罗斯攻击的德国防空系统,有可防范化学武器的空气过滤系统,还有一个专用电力系统,在电网出现故障时可供使用。


The question that some Ukrainian intelligence officers are now asking their American counterparts — as Republicans in the House weigh whether to cut off billions of dollars in aid — is whether the C.I.A. will abandon them. “It happened in Afghanistan before and now it’s going to happen in Ukraine,” a senior Ukrainian officer said.
随着众议院的共和党人考虑是否切断对乌克兰的数十亿美元援助,乌克兰一些情报官员现在向他们的美国同行提出的问题是,中情局是否将抛弃他们。“这以前在阿富汗发生过,现在也将在乌克兰发生,”一名乌克兰高级官员说。


Referring to Mr. Burns’s visit to Kyiv last week, a C.I.A. official said, “We have demonstrated a clear commitment to Ukraine over many years and this visit was another strong signal that the U.S. commitment will continue.”
在谈到伯恩斯上周对基辅的访问时,中情局的一名官员说:“我们已向乌克兰展示了多年的明确承诺,这次访问是美国将继续履行承诺的又一个强烈信号。”


The C.I.A. and the HUR have built two other secret bases to intercept Russian communications, and combined with the 12 forward operating bases, which General Kondratiuk says are still operational, the HUR now collects and produces more intelligence than at any time in the war — much of which it shares with the C.I.A.
中情局和HUR已建成了另外两个拦截俄罗斯通讯的秘密基地,加上孔德拉蒂乌克说仍在运行的12个前沿行动基地,HUR现在收集和生成的情报比战争中的任何时候都多,其中的大部分与中央情报局分享。


“You can’t get information like this anywhere — except here, and now,” General Dvoretskiy said.
“你在任何地方都得不到这样的信息,除了在这里,而且是现在,”孔德拉蒂乌克说。


Natalia Yermak对本文有报道贡献。


Adam Entous是一名驻华盛顿调查记者,曾两次获得普利策奖。在加入时报华盛顿分社之前,他曾为《纽约客》、《华盛顿邮报》和《华尔街日本》报道情报、国家安全和外交政策新闻。点击查看更多关于他的信息。


Michael Schwirtz是时报国际版面调查记者。他自2006年加入时报,此前自莫斯科报道前苏联成员国新闻,他是因报道俄罗斯情报行动而获得2020年普利策奖的团队的首席记者。点击查看更多关于他的信息。


翻译:纽约时报中文网